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INTRODUCTION
Private merger enforcement is a thorny corner of antitrust law. Private
merger challenges pose considerable potential financial downside for industry
because in many cases, the motivations of private plaintiffs in initiating a
challenge do not align with the purposes of antitrust law. These actions are
risky for plaintiffs as well because they are difficult to win. Plaintiff successes
have been so uncommon that in a Fourth Circuit case decided in February of
2021, the court stated, “private suits seeking divestiture are rare and, to our
knowledge, no court had ever ordered divestiture in a private suit before this
case.”1 While claims brought under section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of
1914 (Clayton Act)2 have been historically underdiscussed, the Fourth
Circuit’s grant of divestiture to a private plaintiff in early 2021 affords us an
opportunity to evaluate this oft overlooked corner of antitrust law. Should
private plaintiffs be able to mold the shape of industries to such a degree?
The remedies for private merger challenges lie in section 4 of the Clayton
Act for monetary damages3 and section 16 of the Clayton Act for injunctive
relief.4 These remedies are clearly authorized by statute.5 Under section 16, a
private plaintiff may seek relief in equity for a violation of the antitrust laws
“when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts
of equity . . . .”6 There are two section 16 cases of note: one idiosyncratic
Supreme Court case from 1990, in which the Court established that private
plaintiffs may seek any kind of equitable relief granted by courts in equity
without limitations,7 and a recent Fourth Circuit case, quoted above, which
granted divestiture to a private plaintiff.8
The Fourth Circuit case, Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., decided
in February of 2021, is the only known successful private post-merger
enforcement case under section 16 of the Clayton Act. Because of this, one
can understand the court’s characterization that the “case [was] a poster child

Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 703 (4th Cir. 2021).
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1914).
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (“Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .”).
5 California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 281 (1990) (“[T]he statutory language indicates
Congress’ intention that traditional principles of equity govern the grant of injunctive relief.”).
6 Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
7 Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 295 (“In a Government case the proof of the violation of law may
establish sufficient public injury to warrant relief.”).
8 Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 724 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he district
court acted within its discretion by ordering divestiture.”).
1
2
3
4
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for divestiture.”9 But there is reason to doubt the propriety of this remedy
under other factual circumstances. While it is clearly authorized by the
statute, it is worth our time to question in what situations courts ought to
grant equitable relief to private litigants. This Comment focuses on plaintiffs
seeking relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, as damages actions under
section 4 of the Clayton Act have their own distinct set of concerns and
considerations too numerous to explore under this one roof.
In Part I, I provide a brief overview of the relevant antitrust laws—in
particular, the Clayton Act and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments.
In Part II, I explore the standing requirements for private litigants under
section 16 of the Clayton Act in merger challenges. I then provide a summary
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in California v. American Stores Co.,10 in which
the Court confirmed that states and other private plaintiffs can seek
divestiture and the full range of equitable remedies under section 16 of the
Clayton Act. Lastly, I undergo a substantive analysis of the 2021 Fourth
Circuit JELD-WEN case.
In Part III, I explore the implications of granting equitable remedies
under section 16 to private litigants in merger challenges. I acknowledge that
private merger enforcement is part of the overall antitrust enforcement
schema designed by Congress, and that the importance of private plaintiffs
in the overall system has been echoed by the Supreme Court. I then detail
counterbalancing concerns unique to private merger enforcement under
section 16 of the Clayton Act. Ultimately, I argue that despite the JELDWEN ruling, courts should continue to review these suits with a critical eye.
When evaluating private merger challenges, courts ought to consistently
apply the antitrust injury doctrine, give preference to consumer plaintiffs
over competitor plaintiffs, and be wary of unrecoverable waste resulting from
divestiture in post-merger consummation challenges.
I. BACKGROUND ON MERGER LAW AND PRIVATE CHALLENGES
“The dominant view of antitrust policy in the United States is that it
should promote some version of economic welfare.”11 This generally means
that antitrust policy seeks to make markets as competitive as they can
reasonably be while ensuring that “firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks
9 Id. at 724.
10 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2471

(2013); see also id. (“Antitrust would also not prefer a world of dominant firms unless dominance was
essential to maintaining technological progress or cost reduction, but the prevailing literature
suggests that this is not the case: greater structural competitiveness is typically conducive to greater
innovation as well.”).
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to attaining productive efficiency.”12 Antitrust in the United States is
simultaneously imbued with the idea that the market can generally attain
these results, and thus intervention is appropriate only where there is a strong
reason to believe that antitrust enforcement will make the market more
competitive and efficient.13 In Section I.A, I discuss the relevant antitrust law,
case law, and the DOJ-FTC Merger guidelines concurrently. This context is
necessary for my later critique of some aspects of private merger
enforcement.
A. The Clayton Act and the DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines
Merger activity increased dramatically at the turn of the twentieth
century in the United States.14 This wave of mergers, in conjunction with the
development of the rule of reason in 1911,15 led many to fear that the weakened
Sherman Act was no match for strengthening and consolidating American
firms. In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914,
which “explicitly condemned anticompetitive price discrimination, tying and
exclusive dealing, expanded private enforcement . . . and condemned mergers
on a far more aggressive standard than the Sherman Act had done.”16
Congress amended the Clayton Act in 1950 through the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments,17 which extended the reach of the Clayton Act to condemn
anticompetitive vertical as well as horizontal mergers, and asset acquisitions.
The amendments reflected a general anxiety at the time about massive firms
squeezing out small family businesses and poor Congressional regard for the
efficiencies associated with many mergers.18

Id.
Id.
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 2.1a (6th ed. 2020) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY]
(noting that the “largest wave of mergers” in U.S. history occurred between 1895-1905). Many
believe this was due in large part to the relaxed prohibitions laid out in the Sherman Act: acting in
concert was condemned, but all sorts of acquisitions seemed to be beyond the reach of the Act. Id.
15 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911) (“[T]he criteria to be
resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have
been committed, is the rule of reason . . . .”); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181
(1911) (mentioning the importance of using the rule of reason to “give effect to the remedial
purposes” contemplated by a law).
16 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 2.1.
17 Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18).
18 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, §2.1 (“The legislative history
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton Act of 1914 is somewhat more concerned with
the protection of small businesses from the unfair or ‘exclusionary’ practices of bigger firms.”).
12
13
14
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Today, mergers are almost19 always analyzed under section 7 of the
Clayton Act.20 Section 7 condemns any merger if its effect “may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”21 This
type of merger produces two notable results: first, after the merger there will
be one less competitor in the relevant market and a corresponding increase
in market concentration; second, the post-merger firm will have a larger
market share than either firm held before the merger.22 Courts have focused
on two primary dangers as a result of mergers:23 increased incidence of
express or tacit collusion,24 and “unilateral effects,” or the combination of two
firms who hold a similar space in the relevant market, allowing for price
increases by the post-merger firm due to enhanced control over their corner
of the market.25
The DOJ and FTC jointly administer merger guidelines to alert
industries to the standards by which potential mergers will be judged. The
guidelines are not legally binding—and the Supreme Court has never decided
a case in reference to them—but the courts have generally deferred to the
agencies.26 The newest iteration of the horizontal merger guidelines came out
in 2010, and “[t]he unifying theme of the[] Guidelines is that mergers should
not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate
19 There is one notable and recent exception to this norm. In the FTC’s complaint filed
against Facebook early in 2021, Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Instagram is being
challenged as “monopoly maintenance through anticompetitive acquisitions” and other acts
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief
and Other Equitable Relief at 76-78, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB
(D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/ecf_75-1_ftc_v
_facebook_public_redacted_fac.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7QA-8396].
20 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, at § 12.1 (noting § 7’s
applicability to the acquisition of both stock and assets by “all persons,” regardless of the status of
incorporation.)
21 Clayton Act §7, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
22 The relevant market is central to the § 7 analysis.

In antitrust cases that require proof of market power the court traditionally determines
whether some ‘relevant market’ exists in which the legally necessary market power
requirement can be inferred. In order to do this, the court usually 1) determines a
relevant product market, 2) determines a relevant geographic market, and 3) computes
the defendant’s percentage of the output in the relevant market thus defined.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 3.1d.
23 I use the term “merger” to encompass stock acquisitions, asset acquisitions and consolidation.
24 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 12.4 (“[O]ne principal concern
of merger policy is that horizontal mergers may facilitate market wide express or tacit collusion.”).
25 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956) (“Price and
competition are so intimately entwined that any discussion of theory must treat them as one. It is
inconceivable that price could be controlled without power over competition or vice versa.”).
26 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 12.1 (“[O]ver the years
the courts have paid close attention to the Guidelines, generally giving the government the benefit
of the doubt.”).
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its exercise.”27 The Agencies focus on decreased output and increased prices
as a result of a merger, and do not focus on other anticompetitive behaviors
like refusals to deal or exclusionary practices.28 The Agencies look to several
types of evidence of adverse competitive effects: “actual effects observed in
consummated mergers,” direct comparisons based on past mergers, market
share and market concentration in the relevant market, “substantial head-tohead competition,” and the disruptiveness of the merging party.29
In coordinated effects cases, the Agencies almost always look to the
concentration of the market as an indicium of likely anticompetitive effects,30
and they usually calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) of
market concentration. “The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight
to the larger market shares.”31 Generally, the Agencies consider HHI below
1500 to be an unconcentrated market, HHI between 1500 and 2500 to be a
moderately concentrated market, and HHI above 2500 to be highly
concentrated.32 The Agencies then look to the hypothetical state of the
market post-merger and the increase in the HHI as evidence of the
anticompetitive impacts of the merger.33
The courts have largely agreed with this framework34 and the underlying
rationale.35 Scholars generally believe that there is a likely positive correlation
27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, supra note 27, § 1 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK86-BGVV]. The
DOJ-FTC also issue joint vertical merger guidelines and remedies guidelines.
28 There might be change on the horizon in this area. By President Biden’s Executive Order on
Competition, the Agencies have been instructed to reconsider the merger guidelines and update them. The
Order states that, in aiming “[t]o address the consolidation of industry in many markets across the economy,
as described in section 1 of this order, the Attorney General and the Chair of the FTC are encouraged to
review the horizontal and vertical merger guidelines and consider whether to revise those guidelines.”
Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, Exec. Order No. 14,036 Section
5(c), 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/07/14/2021-15
069/promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy [https://perma.cc/SUQ6-B3RF]. Right now, the
merger guidelines only focus on unilateral effects cases and coordinated effects cases. These merger guidelines
ought to be updated to increase focus on exclusionary practices, as even the JELD-WEN case discussed infra
in Parts II & III demonstrates that one of the most salient harms that can come from an anticompetitive
merger is exclusion from the market.
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, supra note 27, §2.1 (2010).
30 Id. § 5 (“The Agencies normally consider measures of market shares and market
concentration as part of their evaluation of competitive effects.”). In unilateral effects cases, market
share is relevant to the merger analysis, but not quite so central.
31 Id. § 5.3 (footnotes omitted).
32 Id.
33 Id. §§ 6–13.
34 See, e.g., supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35 This rationale is well illustrated by the language of section 10 of the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, supra note 27, § 10 (“[M]erger-generated efficiencies may
enhance competition by permitting two ineffective competitors to form a more effective competitor,
e.g., by combining complementary assets.”).
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between the concentration of a market and the likelihood of collusive activity
or unilateral effects.36 But there are certainly situations in which markets
function effectively despite being concentrated, and having another larger
player among a dominant few may even increase competition.37 Nevertheless,
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court endorsed
the use of concentration indexes and other data about firm size to find a
merger illegal.38 The Court held a merger which results in one firm
controlling a significant share of the relevant market “and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market . . . is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined
in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects.”39
Mergers, however, have benefits for the market. Mergers produce
efficiencies. For example, larger plants or multi-plant enterprises can be run
more efficiently, and mergers can create economies of distribution.40 Postmerger efficiencies have been viewed differently at different times throughout
history.41 Today, mergers are no longer condemned merely because they make
it more difficult for less efficient, smaller firms to compete. Rather, the
efficiencies of mergers are seen as a benefit to the relevant industry.42
Efficiencies are considered in merger challenges only after a merger has been
deemed presumptively anticompetitive, and ideally “defendants must show
that efficiencies created by the merger are sufficiently large to keep post-

36 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 12.1a (“Most strategies for
earning monopoly profits require either a dominant firm or relatively high concentration as a
prerequisite. Many of the strategies work much better as concentration levels go up.”).
37 For example, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., a merger introduced competition
in a market by reviving failing businesses in an area that otherwise would have had just a few
dominant competitors. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
38 374 U.S. 321, 364-65 (1963) (finding that a commercial bank’s 30% market share presented a
threat to competition).
39 Id. at 363.
40 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 12.1b (“Most mergers . . .
can increase the efficiency of firms by enabling them to attain efficient levels of manufacturing,
research & development, or distribution more rapidly than the firms could accomplish by internal
growth.”).
41 During the Warren Era, the Supreme Court adopted the policy that efficiencies created via
merger were bad because they made it more difficult for less-efficient firms to compete. But in the
decades since, there has been a shift in policy because the Court was never truly effective in
protecting these small firms, and valuing small businesses over national chains is not always aligned
with the promotion of competition, which is the true goal of antitrust law. Id. § 12.2a.
42 Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703, 704 (2017)
(“If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of
competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. But we tolerate most mergers
because of a background, highly generalized belief that most—or at least many—do produce cost
savings or improvements in products, services, or distribution.”).
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merger prices at or below pre-merger levels.”43 Per the DOJ-FTC Guidelines
there exists a limited efficiencies defense, and the Agencies will consider the
advantages of a merger if it seems the benefit of those efficiencies will be
passed on to consumers.44 And the benefits must be merger specific, meaning
that the efficiency might only come about by way of the merger.45
B. Private Right of Action Generally
Private merger enforcement is clearly authorized by statute.46 For any
violation of the antitrust laws, plaintiffs may seek treble damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act or relief in equity under section 16 of the Clayton
Act. Actions for damages are subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and
relief in equity is limited by laches as an affirmative defense. For the
remainder of this piece, I will focus specifically on private merger challenges
seeking equitable relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act.47
II. PRIVATE MERGER CHALLENGES UNDER SECTION 16
For a plaintiff to succeed in a private merger challenge, she must meet
multiple standing requirements. But once a plaintiff has cleared those
hurdles, California v. American Stores established that the full panoply of
equitable remedies are available to private plaintiffs under section 16.48 In the
2021 JELD-WEN case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the only ruling in which
divestiture has been awarded to a private plaintiff under section 16.49 Below,
I discuss the facts of the JELD-WEN case to provide context for my Part III
discussion, in which I argue that the unique facts of JELD-WEN are the only
explanation for the court granting such a drastic remedy to a private litigant,
and courts seeking to interpret the ruling ought to limit it to its facts.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 12.2b2.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, supra note 27, § 10 (“[T]he Agencies consider whether
cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers
in the relevant market . . . .”).
45 Id. (disclaiming asserted efficiency claims that are vague).
46 Private antitrust suits are quite common. In 2020 there were 598 private plaintiff suits and 28
government plaintiff suits. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2020 tbl.C-2 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federaljudicial-caseload-statistics/2020/03/31 [https://perma.cc/B9Z5-G5V9].
47 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 326a (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW] (“[I]njunction covers only future violations, for which
damages are of course not recoverable. As a result, one receives damages for the consequences of
previous violations and an injunction for threatened future violations, which are never recompensed
by the damages award to the extent that the latter covers only the past.”).
48 495 U.S. 271, 275 (1990).
49 See supra notes 8–9.
43
44
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A. Elements of Private Merger Challenges Under Section 16
For a plaintiff to succeed in a private merger challenge, she must show (1)
an injury (or prospective injury); (2) that said injury was caused by a violation
of the laws of antitrust; and (3) that the injury is actually an “antitrust injury”
as described below.50
Injury and causation in private antitrust enforcement are consistent with
the requirements of Article III of the Constitution.51 Proving an injury in fact
is the logical starting point: the plaintiff must have suffered (or will suffer)
harm.52 Causation is equally important, and plaintiffs must show a direct link
between their injury and the actions of the defendant(s).53 Where there are
multiple causes for a plaintiff ’s injury, courts will properly adjust the
attributable damages based off of the plaintiff ’s alleged separation of causes.54
For challenges of prospective mergers or other action in equity seeking
injunctive relief, the injury requirement as articulated in the statute as
“threatened loss or damage.”55
The third requirement for private plaintiffs to seek relief is the “antitrust
injury” doctrine established in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.56
The plaintiff in the case was a local bowling alley owner, and the defendant
was a large, national bowling alley chain that bought up a few failing local
bowling alleys, ultimately turning them into viable businesses.57 The plaintiff
brought a private suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act challenging a few of
the purchases, arguing that had the national chain not intervened, those alleys
would have inevitably gone out of business and not hung around to compete

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 16.3c.
See, e.g., Lucas Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.
1998) (emphasis in original):
50
51

As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has met the
requirements for standing under Article III—that is, whether the plaintiff “has
suffered an injury which bears a causal connection to the alleged antitrust violation.”
If the plaintiff meets the requirements for standing under Article III, the court must
then determine whether the plaintiff also meets “the more demanding standard for
antitrust standing.”
(quoting Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (Jan. 15, 1997)).
52 HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 16.3c (“A private antitrust
plaintiff must establish . . . . that it suffered an injury . . . .”).
53 Id. § 16.4b (noting that one of the most prominent tests for determining plaintiff standing
in antitrust cases is the direct injury test, which determines whether the causal connection between
the suffered injury and the defendant’s violation was direct or indirect).
54 Id. § 16.3c (“Further, the plaintiff seeking damages will eventually have to separate out those
damages caused by the antitrust violation from those caused by other factors.”)
55 Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
56 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). “Antitrust injury” is a requirement distinct from regular injury.
57 Id. at 479-81.
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with the plaintiff ’s businesses.58 The Supreme Court found for the
defendants and, in doing so, they observed that many antitrust violations lead
to harms to competitors “which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.”59 The
Court held that not only must a plaintiff prove a violation of one of the
antitrust laws, but also “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.”60 Today, antitrust injury is a necessary element of
all private antitrust suits.
In Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado, the plaintiff brought an action under
section 16 to enjoin a potential merger that they claimed might lead to
predatory pricing.61 The Court held that while it was likely true that the
defendant would become more efficient post-merger and might be able to
sustain lower prices, the plaintiffs had not proven with sufficient evidence
that the defendants planned to engage in below-cost pricing to drive rivals
out of the market.62 Private merger challenges are tricky because many times,
mergers might actually help competitors. Concentrated markets are more
susceptible to collusion and oligopoly pricing, which allows everyone in the
market to reduce output and raise prices.63
In Cargill, the Supreme Court made clear that the antitrust injury doctrine
extended equally to suits in equity and damages actions.64 Before the Cargill
decision, some courts held section 16’s “threatened loss or damage”
requirement in contrast with the “actual injury requirements” for a successful
section 4 claim.65 But the difference between the two mainly comes down to
numerical certainty—damages must be quantifiable to be awarded under
section 4; as a result, remedies under section 16 are available to a broader class
of plaintiffs.66 But both are appropriately limited by the antitrust injury
doctrine.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 489.
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986).
Id. at 117-122.
See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 16.3a1 (“Horizontal
mergers can facilitate monopolistic or collusive pricing by increasing concentration in the market.
Consumers will pay higher prices, but the post-merger firm’s output reduction and price increase
will benefit other firms already in the market. They can charge higher prices under the ‘umbrella’
created by the larger, post-merger firm.”).
64 479 U.S. at 122 (“We hold that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton
Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, and that a showing of loss or damage due merely to
increased competition does not constitute such injury.”)
65 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 16.3e.
66 See Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (6th
Cir. 1985) (citing Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir.
1980)) (“A higher threshold standard would be inconsistent with the prophylactic purpose of Section
58
59
60
61
62
63
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There are two major types of equitable relief a plaintiff can seek in merger
challenges: ex ante suits seeking injunctive relief, and ex post suits seeking
divestiture. There are also conduct remedies available under the statute (A
must sell B X number of units per year, etc.), but generally private plaintiffs
seek either to block a merger from going into effect or to undo one. Conduct
remedies can be costly to administer, and many times they are not a longterm solution.67
B. The Foundation Laid by California v. American Stores Co.
In California v. American Stores, the Supreme Court established that the
full panoply of equitable remedies are available to private plaintiffs under
section 16.68 There, the state of California sought to enjoin a merger as a
private plaintiff under section 16 of the Clayton Act.69 Despite being a
government actor, for most purposes the state attorneys general are treated
as private plaintiffs when they endeavor to enforce the federal antitrust laws
(as opposed to state antitrust laws).70 American Stores and Lucky Stores, Inc.
were two of the largest supermarket chains in California.71 American Stores
sought to acquire Lucky Stores, and “notified the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) that it intended to acquire all of Lucky’s outstanding stock . . . .”72
The FTC conducted an investigation and found the merger to be in violation

16 of the Clayton Act. Section 16 allows any person to sue for injunctive relief against threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. Section 16 is designed to stop anticompetitive behavior
in its incipiency. As such, the courts have recognized a lower threshold standing requirement for
section 16 than for section 4.”) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); Cia. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 407-08 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Congress empowered a
broader range of plaintiffs to bring § 16 actions because the standards to be met are less exacting
than those under § 4; under § 16, a plaintiff need show only a threat of injury rather than an accrued
injury.”).
67 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES § III.A (2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION] (“A carefully
crafted divestiture decree is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure to preserve competition.
A conduct remedy, on the other hand, typically is more difficult to craft, more cumbersome and
costly to administer, and easier than a structural remedy to circumvent.” (quoting United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961) (internal quotations omitted))).
68 495 U.S. 271, 274-75 (1990) (holding that divestiture is an equitable remedy available for
private plaintiffs under section 16 as “a form of injunctive relief . . . .”).
69 Id.
70 This is also known as “quasi-public” enforcement. The states’ attorneys general can enforce
the federal antitrust laws on behalf of their citizens. When they do so, they are treated like private
litigants, subject to most of the same requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (“Any attorney general of a
State may bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons
residing in such State . . .to secure monetary relief . . . for injury sustained by such natural persons
to their property . . . .”).
71 Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 275.
72 Id.
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of section 7 of the Clayton Act, but they reached a settlement wherein
American Stores would “hold separate” Lucky Stores, “preventing it from
integrating the two companies’ assets and operations until after it had
divested itself of several designated supermarkets.”73 American Stores
accepted the terms, the FTC gave final approval, and the companies were
legally merged into a single corporate entity.
The next day, the state of California filed suit as a private plaintiff alleging
the merger violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton
Act. California argued that the merger would cause considerable loss and
damage to the state as competition in many regions would be eliminated, and
“prices of food and non-food products might be increased.”74 In its pleadings,
the state did the following:
[S]ought, inter alia, (1) a preliminary injunction requiring American to hold
and operate separately from American all of Lucky’s California assets and
businesses pending final adjudication of the merits; (2) such injunctive relief,
including rescission . . . as is necessary and appropriate to prevent the effects
alleged in the complaint; and (3) an injunction requiring American to divest
itself of all of Lucky’s assets and businesses in the State of California.75

The District Court granted the state’s motion for a temporary restraining
order and entered a preliminary injunction. American Stores argued that the
injunction was “tantamount to divestiture since the merger of the two
companies had already been completed,” but the court disagreed, holding
“that since the FTC’s Hold Separate Agreement was still in effect, the
transaction was not a completed merger.”76 American Stores filed an
interlocutory appeal, and the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunction as
contrary to precedent.77 California appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the circuit split over whether divestiture is an available
remedy for private litigants under section 16 of the Clayton Act.
In the precedential Ninth Circuit opinion, the court “reasoned that the
term ‘injunctive relief ’ as used in § 16 is ambiguous and that it is necessary
to review the statute’s legislative history to determine whether it includes
divestiture.”78 After reviewing the history, the Ninth Circuit found that
minutes from a Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives

73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 277 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 277 (citing Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir.

1975)).
78

Id. at 278.
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provided strong evidence that the drafters of the legislation never intended
to authorize private litigants to seek divestiture under section 16.79
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, explaining that “§ 16
states no restrictions or exceptions to the forms of injunctive relief a private
plaintiff may seek, or that a court may order,” rather it is clear from the
language of the statute that Congress intended the “traditional principles of
equity govern the grant of injunctive relief.”80 As a result, the Court held that
“the plain text of § 16 authorizes divestiture decrees to remedy § 7 violations.”81 The
court concluded with a few qualifiers:
Our conclusion that a district court has the power to order divestiture in
appropriate cases brought under § 16 of the Clayton Act does not, of course,
mean that such power should be exercised in every situation in which the
Government would be entitled to such relief under § 15. In a Government
case the proof of the violation of law may itself establish sufficient public
injury to warrant relief. . . . A private litigant, however, must have standing—
in the words of § 16, he must prove “threatened loss or damage” to his own
interests in order to obtain relief. . . .Moreover, equitable defenses such as
laches, or perhaps “unclean hands,” may protect consummated transactions
from belated attacks by private parties when it would not be too late for the
Government to vindicate the public interest.82

After trial, American Stores agreed to sell a number of stores to settle the
remanded lawsuit.83 California v. American Stores conclusively established that
all equitable remedies are available to private litigants under the Clayton Act.
However, despite being able to grant divestiture, no court had ever found a
divestiture remedy appropriate until 2021.
C. Divestiture as a Remedy in Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc.
The Fourth Circuit decided Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc. in
February of 2021.84 It is the only known time a federal court has ordered
divestiture in a private merger challenge. I describe the case in depth, as the

Id. at 278-79.
Id. at 281 (quoting CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F. 2d 404, 416
(1985)) (internal quotations omitted).
81 Id. at 282 (emphasis added); see also id. at 285 (“Section 16, construed to authorize a private
divestiture remedy when appropriate in light of equitable principles, fits well in a statutory scheme
that favors private enforcement, subjects mergers to searching scrutiny, and regards divestiture as
the remedy best suited to redress the ills of an anticompetitive merger.”)
82 Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added).
83 American Stores’ Merger Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1990, at D5.
84 Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690 (4th Cir. 2021).
79
80
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details will be important in my later discussion of the risks associated with
private merger challenges.
This case arose in the American market for doorskins. The plaintiff,
Steves and Sons, Inc., sells molded doors. The defendant, JELD-WEN, sells
molded doors and manufactures doorskins, “some of which it uses in its own
doors, and some of which it sells to other door manufacturers (the
‘Independents’), including Steves.”85 All Independents, including Steves,
must buy their doorskins from suppliers.
Prior to the merger, there were three doorskin suppliers in the market:
“Masonite had 46% market share, JELD-WEN had 38%, and CMI had
16%.”86 Masonite, JELD-WEN, and CMI were vertically integrated, selling
their own molded doors to end consumers and also selling doorskins to
Independents. In May 2012, Steves signed a long-term supply agreement with
JELD-WEN, which required Steves to purchase at least 80% of their
doorskins from JELD-WEN, allowed Steves to break the agreement if JELDWEN’s prices were beat by a competitor, “contained quality assurances,” and
“provided for alternative dispute resolution procedures. . . .”87 JELD-WEN
could terminate the agreement with seven years’ notice, and Steves with two
years’ notice, but “JELD-WEN’s then-CEO told Steves that the company
viewed this as a ‘life time [sic] deal.’”88
JELD-WEN later acquired CMI, which had struggled in the preceding
years.89 Many bidders showed interest in purchasing CMI, including Steves,
but CMI ultimately chose JELD-WEN. This reduced the number of national
doorskin suppliers from three to two.
Steves and JELD-WEN had issues almost immediately. They argued
about JELD-WEN increasing their prices above the rates specified in the
contract (despite declining costs of production) and poor product quality.90
“Internal documents from 2013 suggest that JELD-WEN understood that the
merger gave it added leverage in contract negotiations with the
Independents.”91
In 2014, the only other doorskin supplier, Masonite, announced it would
no longer sell doorskins to Independents. Masonite hoped for itself and
JELD-WEN to maintain their duopoly in the doorskin market. Ultimately,
Masonite wanted to foreclose the downstream market, as barriers to entry for
doorskin manufacture were high and the dependent, purchaser-Independents
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 699.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id. (error in original).
Id.
Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 701.

2021]

Private Merger Challenges

255

would likely not survive long-term.92 In September of 2014, JELD-WEN
exercised its seven year termination option and thereafter would only supply
doors to Steves, who had no other options, above the contract rate.93 In 2015,
the two companies triggered the dispute resolution process agreed to in their
contract, and Steves asked the DOJ to investigate the merger.94
After a failed dispute resolution, Steves sued JELD-WEN in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in June of 2016,
alleging breach of contract claims and challenging the merger under section
7 of the Clayton Act.95 Steves alleged JELD-WEN breached the Supply
Agreement when it supplied doorskins of inferior quality for high prices.96
“[T]he basis of Steves’s antitrust claim was that the merger gave JELD-WEN
too much power in the doorskin market, which emboldened it to charge
higher prices, offer inferior products and customer service, and eventually try
to ‘kill off ’ Steves by refusing to sell it doorskins.”97
Steves sought (1) past damages for breach of contract; (2) future damages
on a theory of loss of access to doorskins; and (3) equitable relief and the
unwinding of the merger.98 JELD-WEN moved to dismiss the antitrust claim
for failure to prove antitrust injury, and claimed that the equitable relief
sought was barred by laches, as it had been four years since the merger.99 The
district court denied the motion and a similar motion for summary judgment.
To start, the district court held a jury trial on the damages claims.100 The
plaintiff’s economics expert maintained that the extremely “high concentration
in the doorskin market made the merger presumptively anticompetitive.”101 “The
expert based this opinion not only on his belief that that JELD-WEN’s enhanced
market power enabled it to raise prices after 2012, but also on the merger’s
placement on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index . . . .” (“HHI”).102 Per the DOJFTC guidelines, the pre-merger market was highly concentrated (3820 HHI)
and extremely concentrated post-merger (5000 HHI), and the “roughly 1,200point increase . . . [was] six times the threshold for presumed illegality.”103

Id.
Id. at 701-02. There is a portion of this opinion devoted to trade secrets violations by Steves
during a period where Steves was trying to determine whether it would be feasible to build their
own doorskin plant. For the sake of concision, I omit those portions of the case.
94 Id. at 702.
95 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 702-03.
98 Id. at 703.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 704.
102 Id.
103 Id. This fact alone likely contributed to the outcome in the case.
92
93
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The district court also made a few evidentiary rulings in Steves’s favor.
For example, the court excluded evidence that the DOJ had investigated the
merger twice and declined to bring charges at the conclusion of both
investigations. Similarly, the court allowed Steves’s 2012 statement on the
merger into evidence, but did not allow the jury to know that the statement
was made to the DOJ. Finally, the court excluded evidence of CMI’s premerger financial issues. “In the court’s view, this evidence couldn’t support a
weakened-competitor defense because CMI’s doorskin business had done
well before the merger and CMI had competitively preferable alternatives to
merging with JELD-WEN.”104 All of these decisions were upheld on
appeal.105
The jury ruled for Steves on the breach of contract claim and “[o]n the
antitrust claim, the jury found that the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton
Act; that this violation caused Steves to suffer an antitrust injury; and that
Steves proved both past damages and future lost profits.”106 The jury awarded
retrospective breach of contract damages, and prospective antitrust damages
based on hypothetical lost profits.107
Next, the district court considered Steves’s request for relief in equity
under section 16 of the Clayton Act.108 Steves’s principal demand was for
JELD-WEN to divest the large plant that they acquired as a result of merging
with CMI. Steves also asked for “several ‘conduct remedies’ to complement
divestiture.”109 The district court applied the test articulated in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC,110 requiring Steves to prove the following to demonstrate
that equitable relief was necessary: (1) a significant threat of irreparable
antitrust injury, even if the injury hadn’t happened yet;111 (2) that monetary
damages were inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) that “considering
Id.
Id. at 714-16. Evidence showing the DOJ investigated and declined to challenge a merger
should be excluded. There are many reasons, having nothing to do with the merits of the case, why
the Agencies might decline to challenge activity. Such evidence could be misleading. Excluding
evidence of the failing company defense was proper because JELD-WEN had not put forth evidence
to meet the required elements of the defense:
104
105

(1) [T]he allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the
near future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable
alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, supra note 27, § 11 (2010).
106 Steves, 988 F.3d at 705.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (citing 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
111 Id. at 705 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969)).
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the balance of the hardships between the” parties, relief in equity was
warranted;112 and (4) that “the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.”113 “On the issue of irreparable injury, Steves
presented evidence of the company’s importance to the Steves family, who
had owned it for 150 years, and to its over 1,000 employees.”114 Regarding the
balance of hardships, the parties disagreed about the amount of damage that
a divestiture would do to JELD-WEN.115 Relatedly, for the public interest
factor, the parties disagreed about how viable the divested entity might be
once separated from JELD-WEN.116 Lastly, JELD-WEN argued that laches
precluded relief in the case, as it had been four years since the consummation
of the merger.117 The district court granted Steves request for divestiture.
In the district court’s view, Steves satisfied the first two factors because
its 150-year-old family-owned business would likely collapse after September
2021 without equitable relief, and such a loss can’t be measured purely in
monetary terms. At factor three, the court found that the threat to Steves’s
survival outweighed JELD-WEN’s hardships, which—while significant—
could be mitigated by ordering the divested entity to sell JELD-WEN as
many doorskins as it needed for two years. And at factor four, the court found
divestiture to be in the public interest because it would restore competition
to the doorskin market by creating a third supplier.118
The district court also “rejected JELD-WEN’s laches defense.”119 The
court held that JELD-WEN must show both “(1) that Steves unreasonably
delayed in bringing suit and (2) that its delay prejudiced JELD-WEN,”120 and
the court found JELD-WEN had proven neither.121
The DOJ filed a brief stating that divestiture was generally the best
remedy for an anticompetitive merger—the position the department has
taken in recent decades where it challenged mergers.122 The court noted the
Department’s five factors that it considers when evaluating whether a

112 Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (internal
quotations omitted).
113 Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (internal
quotations omitted).
114 Id. at 706.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 707.
120 Id. (citing PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2011)).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 706; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 67, § III.C (“The
Division favors the divestiture of an existing business entity that has already demonstrated its ability
to compete in the relevant market.”).
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divestiture would be proper.123 Four of the factors turned on the identity of
the buyer of the divested assets, and the Department of Justice alerted the
court that until a buyer was identified, it was hard to judge the full potential
results of a divestiture.124 JELD-WEN raised concerns that if Steves was
allowed to purchase the divested assets, there would be three vertically
integrated companies in the market and there would be no increase in
competition.125 The district court addressed this issue by providing for a
special master to oversee the auction.126
Ultimately, the district court ordered in relevant part (1) trebled damages
for Steves’s retrospective antitrust claim (breach of the supply agreement);
(2) divestiture of the plant acquired by JELD-WEN, and a backup remedy of
trebled projected monetary losses if the divestiture were not to go through
for any reason; and (3) a court-appointed special master to supervise the plant
in the interim.127
On appeal, JELD-WEN challenged “(1) whether Steves suffered antitrust
injury; . . . (4) whether divestiture was the proper remedy; [and] (5) whether
Steves’s claim for future lost profits was ripe. . . .”128 The Justice Department
filed an amicus brief, in which it argued laches does not categorically bar
divestiture post-merger, and “there’s no evidentiary significance to the
Department’s choice not to challenge the underlying merger, as there are
many reasons why the Department might make that choice.”129
Writing for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Albert Diaz upheld the jury’s
finding that Steves had suffered an antitrust injury.130 JELD-WEN argued
that the damages in the case were breach of contract.131 The court of appeals
began by stating “[w]hether antitrust injury occurred is a question for the
jury to decide, . . . and we must uphold the jury’s finding unless no reasonable

123
124
125

Steves, 988 F.3d at 706.
Id.
[L]etting Steves (who had expressed its intent to bid for Towanda) purchase the plant
might not maximize competition. Doing so, the Department maintained, would create
another vertically integrated doorskin supplier, rather than an independent one, and
might disadvantage Steves’s competitors in the molded-door market. Relying on the
Department’s statement, JELD-WEN contended that it would be improper for the
court to order divestiture without first identifying a buyer.

Id.
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 707.
Id. at 709.
Id. Issues on appeal not relevant to this discussion have been omitted.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 709.
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jury could have reached that conclusion . . . .”132 The court acknowledged that
cases involving both antitrust and breach of contract claims “present a unique
challenge,” and that they must be certain that Steves’s antitrust claim was not
simply a breach of contract claim trying to weasel its way in to treble
damages.133 They “do this primarily by considering whether Steves would
have suffered ‘an identical loss’ if JELD-WEN had breached the Supply
Agreement absent the merger.”134
The court also held the injury constituted an antitrust injury: without the
merger Steves would have had one additional seller to choose from for
doorskin supply; Steves was unable to buy replacement doorskins from the
only other remaining doorskin provider, Masonite, because the duopoly had
inspired the two firms to kill off Independents;135 and “JELD-WEN sought
to leverage its enhanced market power to hurt its customers, including
Steves.”136
The court then turned to JELD-WEN’s attack on the divestiture order.137
JELD-WEN argued that the laches defense was improperly denied, and the
eBay factors were misapplied to the facts of the case.138 As to the laches
defense, the court stated JELD-WEN must prove both unreasonable delay
and that this delay prejudiced JELD-WEN. The court held a four year delay
is not presumptively too long and the laches defense always turns on the
specific circumstances of the case.139 Relevant here, Steves did not have notice
of any antitrust injury sufficient to support a divestiture remedy until two
years after the merger,140 and even then it was bound by the dispute resolution
process as laid out in the contract.141 Further, “the district court didn’t abuse
its discretion in finding that Steves’s delay was reasonable, and thus properly
denied JELD-WEN’s laches defense.”142 Ultimately, because “JELD-WEN
didn’t prove unreasonable delay,” the court did not need to determine
“whether the delay prejudiced JELD-WEN.”143

132 Id. at 710 (citing Int’l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 431 (4th Cir. 1986)
and Int’l Ground Transp. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 475 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 2007)).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 711.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 716.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 716-17.
140 Id. at 717.
141 Id. at 718 (“JELD-WEN’s last argument about delay is that Steves lacks a good excuse for
not seeking divestiture between 2014 and 2016. But evidence supports the district court’s finding
that Steves spent that time diligently exhausting its alternative remedies.”).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 718-19.
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The court then reviewed the district court’s application of the four
equitable factors as laid out in eBay.144 It handled the first two factors
together, “affirm[ing] the district court’s finding that Steves’s threatened
collapse couldn’t be repaired by money damages.”145 The court continued by
stating the permanent loss of a business “is a well-recognized form of
irreparable injury,” and this business loss would be profound because Steves
had been around for more than 150 years and was family-owned.146
The court of appeals then considered whether divestiture was an
appropriate remedy. It found that any other conduct remedy would only have
protected Steves in the short term, and it would have done nothing to increase
competition in the market for doorskins, which was sorely needed for the
future survival of both Steves and the other Independents.147 The court then
examined the district court’s application of the third eBay factor, finding the
balance of hardships tipped in Steves favor: without divestiture, Steves would
go out of business.148 Lastly, in reviewing the application of the fourth eBay
factor, the court of appeals found the district court was correct in finding
“divestiture to be in the public interest because it would add a third supplier
to the doorskin market, thereby promoting competition.”149 The district court
explored fully the viability of the hypothetical divested entity—as divestiture
would be a waste if the divested entity would fail and therefore not increase
competition in the market—and the court of appeals found the lower court
was correct in finding the divested plant would be profitable under alternate
ownership.150
Finally, the court of appeals reviewed JELD-WEN’s challenge of the
“damages award for future lost profits, which would only kick in if divestiture
doesn’t occur.”151 The court of appeals found that because claims for future
lost profits are speculative, “Steves’s future-lost-profits claim wasn’t fit for
judicial decision,” and the court of appeals vacated that portion of the district
court ruling.152
144 Id. at 719 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)) (“A plaintiff
must demonstrate: (1) that it [faces a significant threat of] irreparable [antitrust] injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.”).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 719.
147 Id. at 720 (“[T]he district court reasonably found that a conduct remedy would only protect
Steves temporarily.”).
148 Id. at 721.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 721-24.
151 Id. at 724.
152 Id. at 725.
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JELD-WEN was “the first time an antitrust lawsuit brought by one
company against another—rather than by the US government—has resulted
in a divestiture . . . .”153 Only time will tell whether JELD-WEN is the
beginning of a new era in private merger enforcement, but there is reason to
hope that courts will not find such a remedy appropriate in almost any other
factual scenario.
III. ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE INHERENT RISKS OF PRIVATE
MERGER ENFORCEMENT
In this Section, I explore the implications of granting remedies under
section 16 to private litigants in merger challenges. Despite the JELD-WEN
ruling, private merger enforcement under section 16 of the Clayton Act
should continue to be viewed with suspicion by the courts. More specifically,
in evaluating the field of private merger challenges, courts ought to
consistently apply the antitrust injury doctrine, prefer consumer plaintiffs
over competitor plaintiffs, and view all post-merger consummation challenges
with suspicion, seriously considering any laches defense raised.
A. Comparing Government and Private Equity Suits
There are several differences between public and private merger
enforcement suits. A merger challenge brought by the government “is more
likely. . .to reflect a thorough assessment of the situation and dispassionate
conclusions regarding the public interest,”154 whereas a private plaintiff is
more likely to seek private gain or rectify a private loss.155 While it is true
that courts will decline to grant relief even in private cases when it is not in
the public interest, there are noteworthy, albeit subtle, differences between
public and private enforcement.156
Some rules of antitrust liability are so far-reaching that they “are
administrable in practice only when there is a responsible filtering of the cases
presented to the court and of the reorganizations proposed—something akin
to the prosecutorial discretion of those who make arrests for relatively minor
offenses.”157 Relief in equity in the merger context is extremely far-reaching:
153 Marvin Pipkin, Steves Prevails in Historic Antitrust Litigation as JELD-WEN is Forced to Divest
Towanda Plant, Restoring Competition to Doorskin Market, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 2, 2021, 7:14 PM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210802005804/en/Steves-Prevails-in-Historic-AntitrustLitigation-as-JELD-WEN-is-Forced-to-Divest-Towanda-Plant-Restoring-Competition-to-DoorskinMarket [https://perma.cc/FQ2Y-YU2L].
154 HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 47, ¶303e1.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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if they prevail on the merits, private plaintiffs are given the power to prevent
mergers entirely or unwind them after consummation.
Because of the high stakes, these remedies are only advisable where the
facts are unambiguous and significant, and “the government plaintiff is more
likely than the private plaintiff to withhold suit in lesser instances.”158 But one
must keep in mind the scarcity of government resources. It is possible that
under some administrations, the government is resource-constrained to such
a degree that their “prosecutorial discretion” might not reflect the merits of
the cases they decline to bring.159 Public enforcement is not a constant, and
while the different policy goals of changing administrations are inevitable,
private merger challenges can help to fill that void.160 The importance of
private plaintiffs is made clear by the text of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act,161 and opinions by the Supreme Court.162
To counter this lack of prosecutorial discretion in private merger
enforcement, there are a number of considerations for private plaintiffs that
narrow the circumstances within which a private litigant might seek relief in
equity. Importantly, the government need only prove the defendant’s
antitrust violation to be awarded relief in equity. But the private litigant must
prove the antitrust violation, plus standing and injury—meaning the private
litigant must show actual or threatened harm to itself.163
Id.
See, e.g., Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, Trump Keeps His Pledge to Shrink Size of Government,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/trump-keeps-his-pledge-to-shrink-sizeof-government [https://perma.cc/4YWP-4M96] (“Nearly a year into his takeover of Washington,
President Donald Trump has made a significant down payment on his campaign pledge to shrink the
federal bureaucracy, a shift long sought by conservatives that could eventually bring the workforce down
to levels not seen in decades.”).
160 See, e.g., AM. ANTITRUST INST., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE U.S. 2 (2020), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
AAI_StateofAntitrust2019_FINAL3.pdf [https://perma.cc/34XY-NYT3] (“The U.S. economy
struggles with the cumulative effects of decades of under-enforcement and a step-down in current
enforcement levels under the Trump administration.”).
161 See Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (explicitly authorizing private plaintiffs to seek
treble damages or relief in equity for injury by any act(s) in violation of the antitrust laws); see also
infra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
162 See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) (explaining that the structure of
the Clayton Act makes apparent the importance of private litigants).
163 See Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26:
158
159

Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, . . . when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity[.]
See also HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 47, ¶ 303e3 (4th ed. 2019) (“[A]ctual or
threatened harm to a person with standing is an essential element of the private plaintiff’s equity case, but not
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Further, in California v. American Stores, the Court explained that while
relief in equity was clearly available to private plaintiffs under the antitrust
laws, that “does not, of course, mean that such power should be exercised in
every situation in which the Government would be entitled to such
relief . . . .”164 The court went on to explain the aforementioned requirements
for private plaintiffs: standing and threatened loss or injury.165 Lastly, the
court mentioned “equitable defenses such as laches, or perhaps ‘unclean
hands,’ may protect consummated transactions from belated attacks by
private parties when it would not be too late for the Government to vindicate
the public interest.”166 In each private merger challenge, the tribunal must
determine what facts specific to that case weigh for and against such
remedies.167
“Private antitrust enforcement is an essential complement to its public
counterpart and foundational in promoting competition, defending markets,
and protecting consumers and workers.”168 The Supreme Court has made
clear the importance of the role of private plaintiffs suing under the Clayton
Act.169 The existence of private enforcement is important to the overall health
and effectiveness of the antitrust laws, and this comment should not be
interpreted to suggest that an impending wave of unmeritorious claims by
private plaintiffs must be stopped. Rather, this comment explores the
concerns unique to private merger challenges under section 16, ultimately
suggesting a careful and methodical approach as courts attempt to interpret
the JELD-WEN decision.170
B. Recommendations for the Review of Private Merger Challenges
Despite the JELD-WEN ruling, courts should continue to review these
suits with a critical eye and should largely confine JELD-WEN to its facts.
Post-JELD-WEN, courts must continue to consistently apply the antitrust
injury doctrine, prefer consumer plaintiffs over competitor plaintiffs, and
always question the propriety of divestiture in post-merger consummation

of the government’s. In the government suit, by contrast, an injury to competition must be threatened but
actual harm to any particular consumer need not be established.”).
164 495 U.S. at 295.
165 Id. at 296.
166 Id.
167 Because remedies under section 16 are subject to “the same conditions and principles”
applied by the courts of equity, they are discretionary by nature. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. §26.
168 AM. ANTITRUST INST., supra note 160, at 26.
169 See Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 284 (“The Act’s other provisions manifest a clear intent to
encourage vigorous private litigation against anticompetitive mergers.”).
170 Courts have been careful and methodical in these cases in the past, as JELD-WEN is the
first time a private plaintiff has been granted a divestiture remedy.
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challenges. For reasons infra in Section III.A, courts must be on the lookout
for merger challenges by private plaintiffs brought merely to hinder their
competitors and better their position in the relevant industry.
1. Consistent Use of the Antitrust Injury Doctrine
Some worry that the Cargill decision was deleterious in its effects on
private merger enforcement.171 Before Cargill, many courts held that the
antitrust injury doctrine did not apply to plaintiffs seeking equitable relief,
and rather only applied to plaintiffs seeking trebled monetary damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act.172 Professor Joseph Brodley argued that the high
“antitrust injury” bar as articulated in Cargill created a crisis in private merger
enforcement, in that it improperly restricted the ability of private plaintiffs
to bring merger enforcement suits.173
I believe the Cargill decision was correct in its extension of the doctrine
to cover all private suits.174 There is still less of an evidentiary requirement in
section 16 suits, as “threatened future loss or injury” is a lower burden than
proving monetary damages with any certainty.175 The Cargill decision simply
stands for the idea that the alleged antitrust injury cannot be entirely
speculative, meaning that future anticompetitive behavior cannot be
presumed from an increase in market power alone. In the Cargill case, there
was only evidence that the defendant might be able to achieve lower prices,
which might have simply been due to efficiencies created by the merger.176
171 See, e.g, Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private
Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1995) (citing Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), as the peak decision of the private merger
enforcement crisis).
172 Id. at 5 (“The Cargill decision is notable . . .because the Court applied the antitrust injury
doctrine to a merger injunction action.”).
173 Id. at 3-6.
174 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.3a (6th ed. 2020)
(explaining the Cargill Court’s reasonableness in applying the antitrust injury requirement to
plaintiffs seeking equitable relief).
175 See Brodley, supra note 171, at 3-6 (1995); see also Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-58 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A higher threshold standard would
be inconsistent with the prophylactic purpose of Section 16 of the Clayton Act. Section 16 allows
any person to sue for injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws. Section 16 is designed to stop anticompetitive behavior in its incipiency. As such, the courts
have recognized ‘a lower threshold standing requirement for section 16 than for section 4.’” (citing
Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 1980))); Cia. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 407-08 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Plainly, Congress
empowered a broader range of plaintiffs to bring § 16 actions because the standards to be met are
less exacting than those under § 4; under § 16, a plaintiff need show only a threat of injury rather
than an accrued injury.”).
176 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986) (determining whether
loss of profits in the circumstances of the case could constitute antitrust injury).
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Proving potential future predatory pricing is a different thing entirely, as even
plaintiffs with actual proof of below-cost pricing must still show the ability
of the culprit to recoup their losses.177 What is more, most modern scholars
agree that efficiencies from mergers are valuable.178
Professor Brodley’s fear of a crisis in private antitrust enforcement in the
United States turned out to be an undulation in the ever-fluctuating levels of
private enforcement.179 Additionally, the anxiety expressed by Professor
Brodley and others about the narrowed ability of private plaintiffs to bring
injunctive suits due to a failure to meet the antitrust injury bar rests upon a
supposed equivalence between public enforcement and properly motivated
private enforcement. But private antitrust enforcement has never been
equally as available as public enforcement.180 The antitrust laws are clear: the
private rights of action allowed under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act
require real or threatened harm.181 It is undeniable that the legislative history
of the 1976 Antitrust Improvement Act expresses a desire for private parties
to help enforce antitrust law.182 And it is undeniable that the Supreme Court
itself has stated that “the purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and
injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve
as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”183 But that
understanding of the law cannot get around the standard requirements for
private litigants under the Clayton Act: the statute requires threatened or

177 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(explaining that what’s necessary to hold “a competitor liable under the antitrust laws for charging
low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or, under §2 of the
Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”).
178 See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 46.
180 See William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor
Plaintiff, 82 IOWA L. REV. 127, 138 (1996) (“Private and public enforcement are complementary,
assuring that adequate remedies exist for the full range of antitrust offenses. The antitrust injury
doctrine complements the role of prosecutorial discretion in public enforcement by assuring that
suits are consistent with antitrust goals.”).
181 See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”); Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (“Any person, firm,
corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws . . . .”).
182 H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, pt. 1, at 3 (1976) (“The purpose of H.R. 8532 [amending the
Clayton Act] is to provide a new federal antitrust remedy which will permit State attorneys general
to recover monetary damages on behalf of State residents injured by violations of the antitrust
laws.”).
183 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
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actual injury as a required element of any private claim.184 The antitrust
injury doctrine merely connects a violation of the laws of antitrust with the
requirements of standing as laid out in the text of the Clayton Act.185 A lack
of confidence about harm or prospective harm and the connection between
that harm and a violation of a law of antitrust should be a barrier to suits.186
JELD-WEN was unique in the certainty of antitrust injury. There was
evidence that the two remaining firms in the doorskin market had plans to
“squeeze out” the Independents. The Independents were consumers, so they
were hurt by the price increase in a way that competitors would not be.
JELD-WEN was reducing quality and increasing prices. And without the
merger between JELD-WEN and CMI, Steves and the other Independents
would have had an additional potential supplier of doorskins, which is a big
deal when your market post-merger has only two options.
But there are many cases in which the antitrust injury doctrine serves as
a shield against improperly brought antitrust suits.187 Without the limitations
of the antitrust injury doctrine, there is potential for abuse of the equitable
remedies available under section 16 for plaintiffs who know they are unable
to prove section 4 damages with any certainty, but still desire to hinder the
business of their competitors.

184 Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. Much has been made of the “private attorney
general” metaphor, but I believe it is best regarded as nothing more than a metaphor. The
hypothetical perfectly motivated private antitrust plaintiff who seeks to vindicate the public interest
still cannot act as a public enforcer. The statutes simply do not allow for it.
185 See Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying the merger
challenge for lack of evidence showing likelihood of future anticompetitive behavior). But see R.C.
Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that a merger in a highly
concentrated market which would result in just two firms was evidence enough of potential harm to
warrant a trial on the merits).
186 As Professor Hovenkamp has observed,

For example, the private citizen does not ordinarily have standing to sue another for
drunken driving unless that citizen has suffered injury to her person, property, or
family. By contrast, the state can interdict drunken driving even when the driver has
caused no injury at all in the particular case. Its power results from the fact that
drunken driving is known to have harmful consequences and it is less socially costly
to arrest the driver before rather than after these consequences occur. The private
plaintiff ’s interest, by contrast, is purely remedial.
HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 47, ¶ 303e3.
187 See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The critical
question for determining whether there is antitrust injury is whether the harm is of the kind the
antitrust laws were meant to protect against . . . . As stated above, reduced profits from lower prices
and decreased market share is [sic] not the type of harm Section 4 was meant to protect against.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding plaintiffs failed to establish antitrust injury.”
(citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl–O–Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. ARCO, 51 F.3d 1421, 1433
(9th Cir. 1995))).
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This is an important point. Where the government generally seeks divestiture
to remedy an anticompetitive merger, government suits exist in an entirely
separate world of motive and burden of proof.188 Private plaintiffs, on the other
hand, are not (primarily) motivated by a desire to increase consumer welfare. For
that reason, where there are available and quantifiable monetary damages, courts
should view them differently than they might in a government suit and order
remedies accordingly. Such drastically different outcomes based on changing
factual circumstances demonstrates the importance of stringent application of the
antitrust injury doctrine by the courts.
In JELD-WEN, favoring monetary damages was complicated by evidence
that JELD-WEN and Masonite intended to cut off their supply of doorskins
to all Independents to vertically integrate and wipe out that level of the
market. JELD-WEN’s increasing prices and decreasing quality made matters
worse. But had JELD-WEN’s vertical integration led to increased quality and
decreased prices for end-consumers, there very well could have been reason
for the district court to come to a different conclusion on the matter of
remedies.
2. Preferring Consumer Plaintiffs Over Competitor Plaintiffs
As previously stated, the consumer versus competitor distinction is
important in our analysis of the merits of a case seeking equitable relief. I
believe it is among the most important distinctions, and courts endeavoring
to apply JELD-WEN ought to hold that aspect of the case in their minds as
significant. By nature of consumers’ (and business customers’) desire for
robust competition and competitive prices, it is far more likely that the goals
of these plaintiffs are aligned with the broader policy goals of United States
antitrust law.189 “The preferred plaintiff in a merger case is the consumer, who
is benefitted by the merger’s increased efficiency but injured by its postmerger price increase.”190 However, consumer challenges are rare.191

See discussion supra Section III.A.
See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
District Court found a threat of antitrust injury based upon [plaintiff ’s] status as a purchaser of
advertising in the Morning News. [Plaintiff] alleged that a combination of the Times and the
Morning News would raise advertising rates as a result of the two newspapers’ dominant market
position. The threat of higher prices resulting from dominant market power being a primary concern
of Section 7, the District Court correctly determined that [Plaintiff] had shown antitrust injury.”).
190 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, at § 16.3a3; see also
Brodley, supra note 171, at 24 (“Although consumers generally have more compatible enforcement
incentives than other types of litigants, they lack capability as merger litigants and have rarely
brought suit.”).
191 See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 14, § 16.3a3 (“[C]onsumer
challenges are relatively infrequent.”).
188
189
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Corporate customers are a less ideal merger-challenge plaintiff than the
end-consumer because the corporate customer might stand to gain in ways
not totally related to increased competition. For example, in JELD-WEN,
Steves was on the short list of firms interested in purchasing the doorskin
plant if the court were to order divestiture (which it did).192 But generally it
can be said that plaintiffs who are oriented vertically with respect to
defendants in the case (as a opposed to horizontally) are more likely to be
motivated by factors in alignment with the goals of the antitrust laws because
they are negatively impacted by decreased quality, decreased output, and
higher prices.193
Still, it is uncommon for consumers to face economic harm sufficient to
justify the cost of challenging a merger.194 That is part of what makes the facts
of JELD-WEN so anomalous. The Independents were business customers
purchasing mass quantities of doorskins, so they were hurt by the duopoly’s
increase in doorskin price (as opposed to a competitor who would be helped
by the oligopoly pricing). The harm that befalls consumer plaintiffs and their
motivations in challenging anticompetitive merger activity is likely more in
line with the public benefit than a competitor-plaintiff might be. The
appropriateness of the divestiture remedy turned in part on the position of
Steves with respect to the doorskin manufacturers. Steves was in the best
position to challenge the anticompetitive behavior allowed by the newly
minted duopoly.
While it is doubtful that consumer suits will ever rise to the frequency of
competitor suits, courts should presume a closeness between the vindication
of public policy and the goals of the consumer-plaintiff in a private merger
challenge. This recommendation goes hand in hand with my suggestion that
courts should faithfully apply the antitrust injury doctrine: consumers are far
more likely to meet the antitrust injury requirement.195

Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 723 (4th Cir. 2021).
See, e.g., the discussion of the impacts of the JELD-WEN merger on Steves supra notes 84–88
and accompanying text.
194 Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Consumers
are unlikely to face the prospect of suffering a sufficient amount of damage to justify the cost of
seeking a pre-acquisition injunction.”).
195 While state enforcement actions are not the focus of this comment, states make ideal
plaintiffs for similar reasons. State AGs should continue to be robust enforcers of the federal
antitrust laws, and courts ought to look upon these cases favorably. It is a rare case that consumer
injury will be enough to compel a lawsuit, but a state acting as parens patriae has motives very much
in line with the goals of the laws of antitrust. See Robert F. Roach, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust
Laws: The Case for Dual State and Federal Enforcement, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 103-08 (1994)
(discussing the parens patriae standing of state AGs to enforce federal antitrust laws).
192
193
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3. The Earlier, the Better
For “unscramble the egg[]”196 reasons, pre-merger suits should be viewed
more favorably than post-merger suits seeking divestiture. Section 16 allows
persons to sue for injunctive relief where they fear loss or damage as a result
of a violation of the antitrust laws,197 and “[s]ection 16 is designed to stop
anticompetitive behavior in its incipiency.”198 However, pre-merger
challenges by private litigants are almost always unsuccessful because they are
unable to produce adequate evidence in support of an inference of likely
future injury.199 I offer no solutions to this problem, but only remark that the
private enforcement system would be more effective and less wasteful were
private litigants able to challenge clearly anticompetitive mergers before they
are consummated.200 I view preliminary injunctions as more in line with the
incipiency focus of the antitrust laws, but the barriers facing pre-merger
challenges by private litigants are too complex to deal with here.201 Here, I
will focus more heavily on post-merger suits because JELD-WEN was a post
consummation challenge, and post-merger suits present unique challenges for
courts.
Temporal limitations on merger challenges “serve[] the same functions in
antitrust as elsewhere in the law”: to weed out stale claims, “to put old
liabilities to rest,” and to create incentives for wronged parties to investigate
196 See A NTITRUST M ODERNIZATION C OMM’N: R EPORT AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 47
(2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/29DU-2ZA4] (equating “recreating a competitively viable firm”
to “unscrambl[ing] the eggs . . . .”).
197 See Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 753 F.2d 1354, 135758 (6th Cir. 1985) (“Section 16 allows any person to sue for injunctive relief against threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws.”).
198 Id. at 1358.
199 See AM. ANTITRUST INST., supra note 160, at 27 (citing DeHoog v. Anheuser-Busch Inbev
SA/NV, 899 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2018); Taleff v. Southwest Airlines Co., 554 Fed. App’x. 598 (9th Cir.
2014); Malaney v. UAL Corp., 434 Fed. App’x. 620 (9th Cir. 2011); Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs.,
Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 2010 WL 1541257 (N.D. Cal. 2010)) (“Private merger claims brought before
consummation, which are often effectively follow-on claims to federal review under [Hart-ScottRodino], almost always fail. The major hurdle is the difficulty of showing likely injury prospectively,
insofar as there is no actual evidence of harm or record of bad conduct.”).
200 I discuss this issue again briefly in Section III.C, infra.
201 Christian Schmidt Brewing Co., 753 F.2d at 1358; see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962) (“[I]t is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what
Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for
arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was
still in its incipiency. Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic
force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force
at its outset and before it gathered momentum.”). It is also worth mentioning that because of this
incipiency focus of the Clayton Act, the public enforcement mechanisms are generally better suited
to address anticompetitive mergers because they do not have to meet the standing requirements that
a private litigant must.
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their claims in a timely manner.202 The laches defense presumably is analyzed
with respect to the time of the merger, unless it is the case that a plaintiff’s
awareness of its antitrust injury does not come about until later: there are
situations, like JELD-WEN, where it is not obvious at the time of the merger
that the would-be defendant would abuse its newly gained market power to
intentionally harm competitors or purchasers.203
“[C]ourts often use the Clayton Act’s four-year statute of limitations for
damages claims as a guideline for analyzing laches defenses to injunctive
claims.”204 But the laches defense is flexible in ways that the statute of
limitations is not: defendants must show (1) unreasonable delay on the part
of the plaintiff and (2) prejudice as a result of said delay.205 Unreasonable
delay and prejudice are never more salient than where a private plaintiff seeks
retroactive relief in equity, such as divestiture of acquired assets. As time
passes from the consummation of a merger, the two previously separate
entities integrate personnel, policies, practices, assets, decisionmaking
processes, and future plans.206 More importantly, this new firm must be
able to make strategic decisions and plan for its own future. Forced
divestiture years after the fact may create massive amounts of intangible
loss that will never be regained by competitors or consumers. Even in
this case, JELD-WEN undoubtably made decisions for the future based
on their massively expanded doorskin-manufacture capacity.207 The
disproportionate application of the laches defense against private plaintiffs
as opposed to against the government makes sense. The longer a merger is
allowed to stand (and the greater the prejudice against the merged firm is
risked by divestiture), the more important the proper motivations and
vindication of the public interest become.208
HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 47, ¶ 320a.
See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 (2000) (explaining that under the Clayton Act, “a
cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures
a plaintiff ’s business.” (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeline Rsch., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
204 Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 707 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Oliver
v. SD-3C LLC, 751 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2014)).
205 Id. (citing PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2011)).
206 The time it takes for two firms to integrate is different from industry to industry and situation
to situation. But JELD-WEN started using CMI’s plants for their own production purposes from the
very beginning.
207 Also, in JELD-WEN, the court seemed to consider policy reasons unrelated to the merger
in evaluating the laches defense. JELD-WEN, 988 F.3d at 707 (“Steves’s pursuit of alternative
solutions before suing shouldn’t be held against it because public policy supports such efforts.”).
208 See Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1235 (8th Cir. 2010):
202
203

In this case, Plaintiffs waited nearly two months after A–B and InBev announced their
agreement to merge before filing this lawsuit. Defendants advised that the transaction
could close as early as November 12, yet Plaintiffs did not file a motion for preliminary
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“Apart from enjoining recent but illegal mergers,”209 I question the
wisdom of allowing private litigants to order the restructuring of an entire
industry. Such far-reaching, serious remedies can greatly affect people who
are not even party to the litigation. Court-ordered “[d]ivestiture can affect
the viability of otherwise profitable companies, the status of preexisting
contracts, and the fortunes of rivals.”210 Concerns about ripple effects should
not be dispositive in a public suit, nor in a private suit, but courts should treat
private litigants seeking divestiture as a remedy with heightened skepticism.211
For the reasons previously mentioned, courts should seriously consider
arguments made by defendants in support of a laches defense.212 The facts of
each individual case must be analyzed for the prejudicial effect of delay in
bringing suit. A considered approach to any laches defense will put potential
plaintiffs on alert, and where the deadweight loss from divestiture increases
as firms integrate further, this notice is warranted.213

injunction until November 3, and then only because the court imposed this deadline.
When dealing with transactions of this nature, these were inexcusable delays . . . . In
some cases, lack of diligence in seeking § 7 relief has completely barred the equitable
remedy of divestiture. . . . But even if Plaintiffs were not so dilatory as to trigger the
defense of laches, their failure to obtain a preliminary injunction that would make the
divestiture remedy “easy to administer and sure” must be taken into account in
fashioning an appropriate remedy some years later.
(internal citations omitted).
209 HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 47, ¶ 326b.
210 Id.
211 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1264
(W.D. Wis. 1995), aff ’d & rev’d in part by 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is questionable whether
divestiture of a long completed transaction is an appropriate remedy in a private action under the
Sherman Act. In any event it is not an appropriate remedy here . . . . Divestiture would have a large
impact on third parties . . . that have not been before this Court to protect their interests.”).
212 See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Elliott, 386 F.2d 42, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1967) (“Among
the various kinds of relief which might have been requested by plaintiffs, was an injunction to
prevent the consummation of the merger . . . . However, suits were not filed until immediately after
consummation of the merger. This relief was therefore not then available.”); Antoine L. Garabet,
M.D., Inc. v. Autonomous Techs. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“In this case,
the Court has no difficulty concluding that the Plaintiffs failed to exercise proper diligence in the
pursuit of their claim(s). Even if they had filed suit . . . just one to three days before the merger was
consummated, it is quite possible that their failure to take any action for months after knowing about
the merger may still have proven fatal to their claims for equitable relief.”).
213 Here I should note divestiture is, and should be, viewed favorably in government
enforcement actions even post-merger. This remedy is easy to administer because it does not require
lengthy court supervision like many conduct remedies do, and many times its impact on long-term
competition is more certain. For the reasons discussed above, this same preference is not
appropriately applied to remedies for private litigants. Cf. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., ANTITRUST
DIVISION, supra note 67, § III.C (explaining that divestiture is the preferred remedy for public
merger enforcement actions brought after the merger has been consummated). “The speed,
certainty, cost, and efficacy of a remedy are important measures of its potential effectiveness.
Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases [brought by the government]
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C. Ideal Private Merger Enforcement
Ideally in private enforcement, the projected benefits to consumer welfare
from increased competition that are expected to come about within a
reasonable time period post-divestiture ought to clearly outweigh the loss of
any efficiencies that arose as from the merger and any other collateral losses,
like the firing of employees during divestiture. Obviously, measuring these
potential impacts would be nearly impossible. But this framework might still
prove useful. For example, in JELD-WEN the expected benefits from an
increase in competition appeared to be quite high, as JELD-WEN had
already begun decreasing their quality and increasing the prices of its
products. The efficiencies that came about as a result of the merger might
have been great, but not great enough to lower prices or improve quality. And
JELD-WEN offered little hard evidence of undue hardship on employees or
other externalities. But when the pros and cons are viewed in such a way, it
becomes clear that the earlier an anticompetitive merger is unwound, the
more likely it becomes that the resulting increase in competition would
increase consumer welfare more than it would cause economic waste and
undue hardship.
As a closing note, it is true that in many situations where a private plaintiff
brings a merger challenge, private plaintiffs could have brought their claims
under the Sherman Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws. The FTC
has taken that approach in the recent litigation against Facebook regarding
WhatsApp and Instagram.214 Where many years have passed since the
consummation of the merger, it is likely that some claims would be better
brought as a direct challenge to the anticompetitive behavior, rather than the
merger.
CONCLUSION
Private merger enforcement is part of the overall antitrust enforcement
schema designed and intended by Congress. This understanding of the
importance of private plaintiffs in the overall system has been echoed by the
Supreme Court, but private merger enforcement is rife with potential pitfalls.
While the Fourth Circuit JELD-WEN “case is a poster child for
divestiture,”215 there is reason to doubt the propriety of divestiture remedies
for private plaintiffs under many other factual circumstances. Private merger
because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement
in the market.” Id. § III.A.
214 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 76-78 (bringing claims under section 2 of
the Sherman Act rather than challenging the merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act).
215 Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 724 (4th Cir. 2021).
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enforcement under section 16 of the Clayton Act should continue to be
reviewed pragmatically. Courts should consistently apply the antitrust injury
doctrine, prefer consumer plaintiffs over competitor plaintiffs, and view postmerger consummation challenges with heightened suspicion. The risks of
improper actions are serious: improper divestiture remedies create economic
waste for everyone and inappropriately grant market-shaping powers to
competitors.
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